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Abstract
This sample of the case study of Equality Colorado will demonstrate how counter movements and
litigation may limit and change how an organization surrounding a social movement acts. Colorado
for Family Values helped pass Colorado’s Amendment 2 in 1992, which limited any present and future
anti-discrimination legislation that would protect sexuality as a class. This ballot initiative passed by
53% of Colorado voters, and other states like Idaho and Oregon attempted to replicate this type of
initiative. Amendment 2 challenged the LGB community and compelled the movement to collectively
respond to the religious right with coalitions, pooled resources, and litigation. Equality Colorado,
established in 1992, will exemplify how a social movement could respond to prejudicial legislation. One
of Equality Colorado’s primary tactics was to reframe religion as inclusive of gay rights. It did not
cede religion entirely to its opponents and attempted to delegitimize them by labeling them “radical
right” as opposed to the more popular term “religious right” or “Christian Conservatives”. Additionally,
Equality Colorado tried to compensate for the downsides of litigation by “translating” the legal terms
to the general public and connecting litigators with the broader movement.
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1 INTRODUCTION
1992 was a critical year for the religious right and LGB
movements1. A movement-countermovement dynamic
manifested in Colorado’s Amendment 2, a public fight re-
garding whether sexual minorities should be protected by
anti-discrimination ordinances that historically had pro-
tected race and gender. A religious right social movement
organization in Colorado Springs, Colorado for Family
Values, helped pass this ballot initiative with 53.4% of
the vote2. The Supreme Court overruled Amendment 2
in Romer v. Evans 3 as a result of a successful lawsuit
and activist activity from local Colorado LGB organiza-
tions. This critical moment offers insight as to how key
defensive actors within a social movement responded in
unexpected but remarkable ways in the face of classically
demobilizing factors such as legal attacks and a larger
1LGBTQ+ stands for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender,
and Queer/Questioning and is the most inclusive and widely used
acronym by American activists and academics for sexual and
gender minorities 1. However, this is a historic case study and will
be limited to the terminology of the organizations studied.
countermovement.
Before proceeding, it is critical to understand just
how jarring and comprehensive Amendment 2 was in
restricting LGB rights. The Amendment would have
been added to the Colorado constitution as follows:
NO PROTECTED STATUS BASED ON HOMO-
SEXUAL, LESBIAN, OR BISEXUAL ORIENTA-
TION. Neither the state of Colorado through any
of its branches or departments, nor any of its agen-
cies, political subdivisions, municipalities, or school
districts, shall enact, adopt, or enforce any statue,
regulation, ordinance, or policy whereby homosex-
ual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, conduct, prac-
tices, or relationships shall constitute or otherwise
be the basis of, or entitle any person or class of
persons to have or claim any minority status, quota
preferences, protected status, or claim of discrimi-
nation. This section of the constitution shall be in
all respects self-executing.4
This amendment would have blocked preexisting pro-
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tection ordinances in the progressive cities of Denver,
Boulder, and Aspen. In addition, it would have limited
future political action, in essence barring the LGB com-
munity from passing basic civil rights protection laws.
No other initiative like this had ever been passed against
any minority groups traditionally categorized by race or
gender, but Oregon attempted a similar LGB discrimina-
tory ballot initiative that same election year and Idaho
attempted one a year later5. Colorado Legal Initiatives
Plan (CLIP) brought forth a lawsuit within two weeks
of the election causing a court injunction that prevented
Amendment 2 from going into force6.
This lawsuit culminated in the Supreme Court case
Romer v. Evans3 where Amendment 2 was overturned
on grounds of the equal protection clause of the 14th
Amendment in the Constitution. The Rehnquist court
did not enfranchise sexual minorities a protected class.
Instead, the supportive justices claimed that Amend-
ment 2 was an undue burden and that a group, regardless
of their legal class standing, should not undertake in
regards to future action by the state constitution. In
the words of Justice Anthony Kennedy, “If the constitu-
tional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means
anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare
desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot
constitute a legitimate governmental interest”3. This
was the first time the courts had ruled on behalf of the
LGB community since One, Inc. v. Olesen (1958)7.
Even though Amendment 2 disputes originated in
Colorado, there were nationwide implications for the
religious right and LGB community. If the Supreme
Court had not ruled Amendment 2 unconstitutional in
Romerv.Evans3 other states could have enforced simi-
lar ballot initiatives. Colorado is the best place to investi-
gate the countermovement and litigation effects because
it had all the vital local elements that were products
of broader national trends — evangelical institutions, a
strong LGB presence, Christian LGB members, and a
broadly conservative constituency.
2 LITERATURE REVIEW
The Colorado LGB movement in the 1990s indicates
great political savviness and resilience through its so-
cial movement organizations in a few major ways. Fo-
cusing on organizational features, the LGB movement
would be considered a social movement because it con-
sists of “preference structures directed toward social
change” whereby structures would become more in-
clusive or less discriminatory against sexual minority
groups8. Equality Colorado (EC), Colorado Legal Ini-
tiatives Plan (CLIP), and Equal Protection Ordinance
Coalition (EPOC), however, constitute social movement
organizations (SMOs) because they were “complex, or
formal, organization[s] which [identify] goals with the
preferences of a social movement or counter movements
and attempted to implement those goals”. The LGB
social movement demonstrated McCarthy and Zald’s
resource mobilization framework by capitalizing on its
preexisting social networks to delegate jobs within the
movement and fight Amendment 2 from different an-
gles8. For example, CLIP handled a lawsuit while EC
focused on education and outreach. Next, those social
movement organizations, specifically EC, challenged the
religious right countermovement in nontraditional ways
through a religiously inclusive framework.
Countermovement scholars like Meyer, Staggenborg,
and Mottl argue that when a countermovement attacks
a movement, the original movement can become disori-
ented and lose sight of its own goals in the attempt to
fight the countermovement. The movement must per-
ceive some gained traction over the opposition, or it may
dismantle itself. EC defied this expectation by fighting
the religious right culturally through an inclusive re-
ligious framework9 10. EC offensively positioned itself
against the religious right by harnessing and maintaining
its own LGB religious networks through the Voices of
Faith campaign. This borrows from Hayes’ notion of
trait ownership in candidacy whereby the LGB move-
ment encroached on its opposition’s perceived traits11.
Given the historically imbedded moment, religion was
a politically viable and opportune choice in the early
1990s given the perceived national weakening of the reli-
gious right. What’s more, using McCarthy and Zald’s
language8, religion was a means to capture potential
beneficiaries in the mainstream community while turning
LGB constituents to adherents. That is to say, religion
could mobilize new people and expand awareness of the
LGB experiences pertaining to Amendment 2.
Perceptively aware of the downsides of litigation, EC
acted as a litigation translator and lawyer-activist liaison
to compensate for the demobilizing effects of a lawsuit.
Street activists are often frustrated by the resource drain
caused by litigation and the relatively limited goals that
can be realized through litigation12,13. In regard to
Amendment 2, the Colorado LGB movement did not
have a choice but to litigate, so it was vital to pre-
vent resentment within the LGB activists. By equipping
the LGB members with rights language, Amendment 2
grievances could be understood through legal terms that
secured the attention of the mainstream public14. This
was a way to export the LGB experience to the main-
stream through the legal argument that if Amendment
2 could disenfranchise LGB people, it could adversely
infringe on universal rights.
This research is grounded in the American Political
Development (APD) notion that history is vital to un-
derstanding politics. Institutions and ideas underpin how
political actors can realize their goals15. This historic
case study may expand current academic assumptions
about the presence of litigation in counter movements16
With this in mind, there is much that can be learned
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from this case study, but it is historically imbedded, and
its transferability limited.
3 METHODS
In order to study these LGB SMOs, I visited the Denver
Public Library’s archives from February to April 2019
and interviewed local Colorado LGB historian David
Duffield affiliated with the LGBTQ+ Center on Colfax.
I clustered the following materials chronologically and
categorically: meeting minutes, internal planning doc-
uments, event fliers, correspondence between EC and
other SMOs, educational pamphlets, and newsletters. I
relied on David Duffield for broader LGB context be-
yond the SMOs. I investigated any emergent and key
actors who were writing the articles and any event ad-
vertisements either hosted by EC or their allies. Based
on the literature pertaining to movements, the two most
prevalent and surprising aspects of this concept map-
ping were litigation and the religious appeal. Thus, the
remainder of this paper will focus on how EC attempted
to realize these two emergent trends.
4 CASE STUDY
The religious right put Amendment 2 on the ballot
with the help of a Colorado Springs-based organization
called Colorado for Family Values (CFV). As parachurch
organizations2 cropped up in the 1980s, Colorado Springs
became a hub for politically engaged evangelicals who
spread “family values,” a code for conservative social
policy. Behind this small local group run by a local
car salesman was a much larger conservative religious
movement. The same year that Amendment 2 passed,
Focus on the Family moved to Colorado Springs from
southern California18. Amendment 2 emerged from this
growing evangelical political network.
In order to pass the amendment, CFV framed the pub-
lic debate within the constructed idea of “special rights”
and relied on the broader Colorado evangelical commu-
nity for support. According to political scientist Nancy
Wadsworth, this argument worked within the framework
of a larger “special rights” campaign put forth by evan-
gelicals at the time claiming to protect racial minorities.
This galvanized other protected classes like the African
American community to support Amendment 24. CFV
proposed that gay rights were “special rights” as op-
posed to civil rights. This “special rights” campaign was
a public appeal, not a legal argument specified in the
language of the ballot initiative or constitution6.
Cities in Colorado had been focal points for the LGB
community since WWII. Denver was the main hub for
2Parachurches are typically nondenominational organizations
doing evangelical work funded privately. They can have religious or
nonprofit status. They could range in interests from homelessness
services to multicultural community centers 17).
the intermountain west and was the only major LGB
friendly city between Chicago and San Francisco? ,19).
By 1990, Denver, Boulder, and Aspen had passed mu-
nicipal ordinances that protected the LGB community
from public accommodation discrimination. These were
the very ordinances that Amendment 2 overturned, ex-
emplifying the movement-countermovement dynamic
studied by sociologists like Mayer Zald, John McCarthy,
David Meyers, and others. According to social movement
scholar Tina Fetner in her book How the Religious Right
Shaped Lesbian and Gay Activism 20, the religious right
and LGB community had challenged each other since
the Stonewall Riots in 1969 even within the state of
Colorado.
Prior to Amendment 2, the LGB community had been
politically latent. In order to pass municipal protections,
a handful of lawyers like Tea Schook had worked together
in the short term in EPOC, but there were few perma-
nent, local SMOs21. These weak organizations largely
contributed to why CFV could be successful. However,
after Amendment 2 passed, the LGB community was in
crisis. The preexisting activists like Tea Schook started
CLIP to handle the lawsuit and EC to educate and in-
form the LGB and mainstream community about the
lawsuit and effects of Amendment 222 23.
No matter how surprised the LGB community was
by the passage of Amendment 2, the members had no
choice but to organize and respond. In the words of
lawyer Jean Dubofsky, who represented the LGB posi-
tion at the Supreme Court, “[Amendment 2 prohibited]
all levels of government in the State of Colorado from
ever providing any opportunity for one to seek protection
from discrimination on the basis of gay orientation”24.
The LGB community could not remain complacent; it
merely became a question of how best to respond in a
politically astute way.
State and national legislation was impossible. At the
state level, the nature of Amendment 2 as a Colorado
Constitutional amendment prevented state and munic-
ipal legislation efforts. Furthermore, if Amendment 2
were to be fully enacted, it would be nearly politically
impossible to act collectively to produce the necessary
signatures to overturn Amendment 2 as a ballot initia-
tive in the following election cycle. Nationally, a federal
bill or amendment could have nulled the state amend-
ment under the Supremacy Clause of Article VI in the
Constitution. However, this too, was not feasible. Even
though Democrats had just won control of the presidency,
house, and senate in the same election that Amendment
2 passed, the Democrats were only natural allies because
the religious opposition successfully wedged itself into
the Republican Party with the help of Ralph Reed’s
new leadership in the Christian Coalition. However, a
seat at the legislative or executive table did not neces-
sarily translate into beneficial legislation. According to
a Gallup Poll taken June 1992, only 48% of respondents
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thought homosexual relations should be legal between
consenting adults, and 8% had no opinion25. Thus, the
national legislature and executive were also unlikely to
politically support overturning Amendment 2. A lawsuit
starting at the local level was the only viable solution for
the LGB movement despite the downsides of litigation.
By the end of 1992, EC had a clear, concise goal
to challenge the religious right, but it had an identity
crisis regarding how to achieve this about a year after
initial establishment. According to meeting minutes from
September 26, 1993, EC appeared to have lost focus
in the year between the organization’s founding and
this meeting. Discussions during this meeting revolved
around, amongst other things, whether to advocate or
educate, resentment towards wasted time in coalitions,
whether to boycott, buycott3, or neither. The occasion
for debate was pressing because the stakes to overturn
Amendment 2 by compelling new people to donate their
time or money towards the effort were high. A meeting
attendee said, “we are imploding—what the religious
right wants” and “our mission is not about what CFV
is, it’s about us”26.
Ultimately, what this document confirms is that mem-
bers of EC felt themselves to be “focusing on too many
things.” By the end of 1993, a new goal emerged focusing
on an offensive position relative to the religious right.
“We don’t counter the CFV, we should be proactive and
tell the truth so that what [CFV] says is laughed out of
the room”26. From this point forward, EC emphasized
its religious appeal to the LGB and mainstream com-
munity. Harnessing religion as inclusive was strategic
in that it delegitimized its opposition and was offen-
sive by garnering new support for LGB goals from the
mainstream community.
5 RELIGIOUS APPEAL
EC’s first critical internal choice was to refer to the
religious right only as the radical right. In 1993, the
first two newsletters use the term religious right. By
the third newsletter, EC put religious right in quotes
as “religious right.” This first subtle rhetoric shift ques-
tioned the opposition’s religiosity. EC wanted readers
to question both aspects of this term—the religiosity
and the political right-wing character. In parallel, CFV
and the religious right more broadly embraced the term
“radical gay agenda” with films like “the Gay Agenda”
documentary in 1993.
After this subtle syntactical shift, EC started using
the term radical right. This was a powerful usurping
of language. First, by deleting religion all together, the
term deflated the legitimacy of the religious right as
a whole. Religion can be and has been a mobilizing
3A buycott refers to only economically supporting LGB friendly
businesses.
force for progressive and conservative politics. Nothing
about the term religious should imply either. Further-
more, the term religion typically often gives organiza-
tions some semblance of legitimacy for those who find
religion salient. Most people may not support an organi-
zation labeled “discriminatory right” but they might if
it is labeled “religious right.” Organizations like Focus
on the Family and CFV stood to lose their credibility if
they were to stop being perceived as grounded in religion
or the political mainstream.
However, a natural argument to debunk CFV may
have been to argue for a greater wall of separation be-
tween church and state where the religious right should
not have been allowed to impose its religiously informed
politics on others. In an undated memo, EC directly ad-
dressed the role of religion in civil society more broadly
by harnessing the constitution and arguing on behalf of
a porous wall of separation.
Equality Colorado trusts that the constitutional
framers knew what they were doing when they
called for freedoms of and from religion. We know
that religion can be a transforming vehicle for peo-
ple of faith. We know that religion can hurt people
when it is used to exclude... we respect everyone’s
right to make moral and ethical decisions based on
its values. Equality Colorado is organizing “Voices
of Faith for Human Rights,” an interfaith collation
of people whose religious beliefs lead them to be
human rights.27.
In this quotation, EC critiqued the opposition as using
religion to exclude but recognized the transformative
nature of religion. EC recognized that if it could harness
religiously founded values, it could be more compelling
than other types of value claims like human rights. Based
on this memo, EC decided against demonizing religion
and rather opted to harness it for its own ends. Addi-
tionally, this memo substantiates why EC started Voices
of Faith, an education initiative to build its religious
network.
Amidst EC’s internal memos, external newsletters,
and critical decisions depicted in meeting minutes, a
nuanced attack against its countermovement emerged.
Instead of the LGB movement remaining backed in a de-
fensive corner with the religious right demoralizing them
and causing a potential implosion, it adopted an offen-
sive position by harnessing inclusive religion to connect
its own religious network and to equip the community
with counterarguments to the religious right. This is an
interesting example of how a movement with relatively
little political opportunity can mobilize and condemn
its opponents in a nontraditional way. EC redefined the
traits of the opposition in order to garner more support
and undermine the countermovement’s legitimacy.
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6 LITIGATION EDUCATION
EC attempted to fill a vital role in Amendment 2’s law-
suit process as an educator. EC clarified legal terms,
set expectations, and made the courts more palpable to
the public through relatable appeals and by connecting
litigators to activists. These were attempts to compen-
sate for the potential downsides of litigation whereby
the grassroots activists may have felt disenfranchised by
how much money and effort was invested in litigation.
Like the countermovement offensive tactic in the earlier
section, this litigation work depicted a savvy SMO aware
of the downsides of litigation, attempting to overcome
those institutional barriers. As previously discussed, a
lawsuit was the only option, but a lawsuit can cause
detrimental effects on the movement as a whole because
it can split the activists from the litigators. Activists may
become disenchanted with litigation because it tends
to shift the movement’s goals and resources toward a
small cohort of elite actors like attorneys. “Litigation
strategies, regardless of outcome, have the potential to
deradicalize and subtly reshape social movements in un-
desirable ways, all while supporting the status quo”12.
In order to keep the broader movement engaged in
the litigation process, EC emerged as a sort of liaison
between the litigators and activists. This served to keep
the other LGB activists realizing social movement goals
even though other SMOs were litigating. According to
Alan Hunt, each court decision, regardless of outcome,
can be an opportunity to have critical dialogue regard-
ing the nature of the lawsuit14. For this reason, EC
incrementally updated the public on the litigation pro-
cess while explaining legal terms in layman terms so
that each litigation success could be perceived as a step
towards overturning Amendment 228.
Another beneficial role that EC filled was emotionally
connecting the LGB activists and community members
to the litigators. Legal scholar Sandra Levitsky argues
that queer activists in Chicago felt compelled to take
direction from the litigators without having any control
of whether they actually wanted to spend money and
effort on a lawsuit. Levitsky’s study exemplifies how a
large separation between the grassroots activists and
the litigating elites can fracture a movement13. The case
study of EC offers an alternative to the LGB Chicago ex-
perience. Instead, EC consistently thanked CLIP, ACLU,
and the Lambda Legal Defense for its “tireless work on
the court case”28. EC also hosted events to connect ac-
tivists and litigators during the four-year process. For
example, on October 9, 1995, the evening before the hear-
ings at the US Supreme Court, CLIP and EC hosted
a Q&A session for people to ask questions about the
lawsuit and proceedings29.
Publishing emotional appeals to make litigation seem
less dry and distant was another way EC prevented
the broader movement from resenting the lawsuit. For
instance, when covering the Supreme Court case, liti-
gator Pat Steadman, who later won the Harvey Milk
Champion of Change award for his vital legal work in
fighting Amendment 2 as a lawyer and community orga-
nizer, published his personal account of the experienced.
Steadman wrote like a storyteller creating imagery and
introducing characters29. He reported the experience in
a dramatic way potentially in an attempt to make read-
ers imagine themselves at the Supreme Court. Steadman
concluded his observations,
Standing outside the court, feeling the warm sun-
shine on my conservative, dark blue suit, I felt an
incredible sense of relief. Looking up at the Court,
and reading the word Equal Justice Under the Law
which are inscribed on the pediment, I felt... as
though those words really did apply to me too... it
was very obvious that those four words were at the
heart of this case.29
This emotional commentary appealed to the sanctity
of the courts like the cinematic end Amendment 2 de-
served after years of litigation. The judicial branch was
established to protect the minority from the masses, and
in this case, Steadman felt that the courts had filled
that role.
EC attempted to fill a vital role in Amendment 2’s
lawsuit process as an educator. EC clarified legal terms,
set expectations, and made the courts more palpable to
the public through relatable appeals and by connecting
litigators to activists. These were attempts to compen-
sate for the potential downsides of litigation whereby
the grassroots activists may have felt disenfranchised by
how much money and effort was invested in litigation.
Like the countermovement offensive tactic in the earlier
section, this litigation work depicted a savvy movement
aware of the downsides of litigation, attempting to over-
come those institutional barriers.
7 CONCLUSION
EC was established in order to fight CFV and inform
the broader LGB movement about the litigation pro-
cess. This very specific niche was constructed to fight
Amendment 2 as an information disseminator. When
the fight ended in 1996, EC was in a quandary. It had
never existed beyond the scope of its countermovement,
litigation, and Amendment 2. EC disbanded by the early
2000s. Though EC did not survive to see marriage equal-
ity or the first openly gay governor in the country, it may
have created the model of a litigation and political educa-
tor for future Colorado LGB SMOs21. Within ten years
of EC’s closure, One Colorado emerged on the local ac-
tivist scene doing similar work to EC, such as promoting
legislation and undergoing litigation efforts. Moreover,
“One Colorado [is now] working to change the hearts
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and minds of everyday Coloradans on LGBTQ issues.
Through [its] public education efforts where [members]
tell the stories of the barriers LGBTQ Coloradans face
every day”30. One Colorado’s emphasis on education
and outreach is strikingly similar to EC and indicates
that EC modeled an effective local SMO in its short
existence. The LGB social movement and its SMOs like
EC and CLIP defied what legal, political, and social
movement scholars would expect to observe after the
passage of Colorado’s Amendment 2. EC set a precedent
within the state that future organizations like One Col-
orado attempted to fill. This case study is important for
the LGB community who was comprehensibly attacked
by the religious right in 1992 and would be attacked
numerous times again in years to come. Furthermore,
its organizational and political savviness inspires new
questions in the academic fields of social movements and
law and society.
8 EDITOR’S NOTES
This work was adapted from a senior thesis and has
been condensed for publication. Contact DUURJ staff
for the full publication.
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